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Abstract 
There is an increasing body of evidence suggesting that trans-
mission of respiratory viruses occurs through the inhalation of
virus-laden particles. Our study describes the use of an aerosol
sampling system to monitor the prevalence of airborne viruses in
a hospital setting. Using SKC AirCheck Touch pumps, with
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
bioaerosol samplers and SKC filter cassette blanks, 28 aerosol
samples were collected in a hospital ward in Singapore. Following
DNA/RNA extraction, real-time RT-PCR/PCR was used for the
detection of influenza A, B and D viruses, coronaviruses,
enteroviruses, and adenoviruses. Airborne virus was detected in
nine (32%) of 28 samples. Among the nine positive samples, eight
were PCR-positive for adenovirus and one for influenza A virus.
Our data suggest that bioaerosol sampling could be valuable in
monitoring for airborne respiratory viruses in clinical environ-
ments to better understand the risk of infection during a hospital
visit.
Introduction 
Despite efforts to reduce the incidence of nosocomial infec-
tions by measures such as practicing good hand hygiene and the
use of personal protective equipment, hospital-acquired infections
are still frequent. Two of the largest hospitals in Singapore report
that on average, one in seven hospitalized patients acquire a noso-
comial infection,1 with immunocompromised children at greatest
risk. Little is known regarding the transmission of respiratory
viruses in clinical environments. Theoretically, influenza and
other respiratory viruses are transmitted through contact with con-
tagious persons and contaminated fomites. However, there is an
increasing body of evidence supporting the concept of transmis-
sion through the inhalation of virus-laden particles. Specifically,
airborne virus-laden particles ≤4μm are thought to play a signifi-
cant role in respiratory virus transmission as they can remain in




Aerosol samples were collected in a general pediatric ward at
KK Women’s and Children’s Hospital, Singapore, using three
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
two-stage cyclone samplers and one SKC filter cassette preloaded
with a 37mm polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) filter (0.3μm pore
size) designed to sample for severe acute respiratory syndrome-
associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV). Aerosol samples were col-
lected once per week for seven weeks in May and June 2017. The
NIOSH samplers were stationed on tripods and placed along the
corridor outside the open patient bedding area, and one SKC filter
cassette was attached to a mobile computer on wheels (COW)
used by doctors and nurses during ward rounds. Each sampler was
connected to an AirChek® TOUCH Sample Pump (SKC, Eighty-
Four, USA) with Tygon tubing (61 cm length, 0.635 cm diameter)
for air collection at a rate of 3.5 L/min. A total of 840 L of air was
collected during each four-hour sampling period. Each NIOSH
sampler separates collected particles into three aerodynamic diam-
eters: >4μm, 1-4μm, and <1μm.3 Filter cassettes and sample tubes
from the NIOSH samplers were stored at -80˚C before processing.
Prior to nucleic acid extraction, sample material collected in the 1-
4 μm and <1μm size fractions were combined (described below).
Nucleic acid extraction
PTFE filters were removed from the cassettes attached to the
NIOSH samplers, transferred to 50 mL falcon tubes and vortexed
for 15 s. One mL of 0.5% bovine serum albumin (BSA) fraction V
in molecular grade water was then added to each 50mL falcon
tube and vortexed again for 15 s. One mL of 0.5% BSA was added
to each 1.5mL conical tube from the NIOSH samplers and vor-
texed for 15 s. These BSA solutions were then pooled into a 2mL
cryovial tube. Two mL of 0.5% BSA fraction V solution was
added to each 15mL falcon tube from the NIOSH samplers, vor-
Significance for public health
We demonstrated the potential for airborne respiratory viruses to circulate
among hospitalized children, nursing staff and visitors. We argue that
bioaerosol sampling could serve as a noninvasive and low-cost method to
monitor for novel respiratory virus incursions in clinical settings, and better











texed for 15 s, and transferred to a cryovial tube and stored at -
80˚C until further used. Styrene filters from SKC cassettes were
swabbed with FLOQSwabs soaked in 0.5% BSA fraction V solu-
tion. Swabs were then placed in 50mL falcon tubes, vortexed for
15 s, and transferred to cryovials. QIAamp viral RNA kit and
QIAamp DNA Blood kit (Qiagen) were then used to extract RNA
and DNA, respectively, from the sample solutions following the
manufacturer’s protocol. 
Real-time RT-PCR/PCR
RNA was tested for influenza A, B, and D,4-6 coronavirus,7 and
enterovirus8 using Superscript III One-step RT-PCR with Platinum
Taq Polymerase. Extracted DNA was tested for adenovirus by real-
time PCR using a QuantiNova Probe PCR kit (Qiagen) (Table 1).8
Cell culture
For adenovirus-positive aerosol samples, 500 μL of sample
was inoculated into adenocarcinomic human alveolar basal epithe-
lial (A549) cells (ATCC® CCL 185™) with Dulbecco’s Modified
Eagle Medium (DMEM) 2% (v/v) Fetal Bovine Serum (FBS), and
incubated at 37°C. After 72 hours, inoculated shell vials were
observed for cytopathic effect (CPE) daily for ten days. For
influenza A virus-positive aerosol samples, 200 µL of sample was
inoculated into Madin Darby Canine Kidney (MDCK) cells
(ATCC® PTA-6500™) with DMEM containing 100 U/mL peni-
cillin, 100 µg/mL streptomycin, 0.2% (w/v) BSA, 25 mM 4-(2-
hydroxyethyl)-1-piperazineëthanesulfonic acid (HEPES) buffer,
and 1 µg/mL Tosyl phenylalanyl chloromethyl ketone (TPCK)-
treated trypsin, and incubated at 37°C for 7 days with daily obser-
vances for CPE.
Results
Eight (28.5%) of the 28 aerosol samples tested positive for
adenovirus and one (3.5%) tested positive for influenza A virus.
Aerosol samples with real-time RT-PCR/PCR cycle threshold (Ct)
values <40 were considered positive. All eight adenovirus-positive
samples were retrieved from the NIOSH samplers, 3 (37.5%) of
which were from particles >4μm in aerodynamic diameter, and 5
(62.5%) from particles ≤4μm in aerodynamic diameter. The cap-
tured influenza A virus-positive particles were retrieved from a
mobile SKC filter cassette and were therefore ≥0.3μm. None of the
aerosol samples tested positive for influenza B or D virus,
enterovirus or coronavirus. Attempts to grow viruses in cell culture
from positive aerosol samples were unsuccessful.
Discussion
Our pilot study provides molecular evidence of airborne respi-
ratory viruses in a general pediatric ward in Singapore. Our results
illustrate the potential of airborne respiratory viruses to circulate
among hospitalized children, nursing staff and visitors.
Additionally, we detected respirable virus-laden particles (≤4μm in
diameter) which are thought to play a significant role in respiratory
virus transmission. Aerosol samples testing positive for influenza
A virus and adenovirus demonstrates the potential of these viruses
to be transmitted via the airborne route. However, we were unable
to document the viability of the virus particles and subsequent risk
of infection. Additionally, the source of these viruses in the ward is
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Table 1. Sequences of primers and probes for RT-PCR/PCR assays.
Assay                                                     Primer Name                                      Primer Sequence (5'->3')
Influenza A Real-time                                         InfA-F Primer                                                     GACCRATCCTGTCACCTCTGAC
                                                                                 InfA-R Primer                                                    AGGGCATTYTGGACAAAKCGTCTA
                                                                                 InfA-P Probe                                                      FAM-TGCAGTCCTCGCTCACTGGGCACG-BHQ 1
Influenza B Real-time                                         InfB-F Primer                                                    TCCTCAAYTCACTCTTCGAGCG
                                                                                 InfB-R Primer                                                    CGGTGCTCTTGACCAAATTGG
                                                                                 InfB-P Probe                                                      FAM-CCAATTCGAGCAGCTGAAACTGCGGTG-BHQ 1
Influenza D Real-time                                         qRT-FluD-F                                                         GCTGTTTGCAAGTTGATGGG
                                                                                 qRT-FluD-R                                                         TGAAAGCAGGTAACTCCAAGG
                                                                                 qRT-FluD-Probe                                                FAM-TTCAGGCAAGCACCCGTAGGATT-BHQ 1
Coronavirus Real-time                                       Cov-NL63-F Primer                                           GTTCTGATAAGGCACCATATAGG
                                                                                 Cov-NL63-R Primer                                          TTTAGGAGGCAAATCAACACG
                                                                                 Cov-NL63-Probe                                                TXR-CGCATACGCCAACGCTCTTGAACA
                                                                                 Cov-OC43-F Primer                                          CATACTCTGACGGTCACAATAATA
                                                                                 Cov-OC43-R Primer                                          ACCTTAGCAACAGTCATATAAGC
                                                                                 Cov-OC43-Probe                                               YAK-TGCCCAAGAATAGCCAGTACCTAGT
                                                                                 Cov-HKU1-F Primer                                          TCCTACTAYTCAAGAAGCTATCC
                                                                                 Cov-HKU1-R Primer                                         AATGAACGATTATTGGGTCCAC
                                                                                 Cov-HKU1-Probe                                               CY5-TYCGCCTGGTACGATTTTGCCTCA
                                                                                 Cov-229E-F Primer                                           CATACTATCAACCCATTCAACAAG
                                                                                 Cov-229E-R Primer                                           CACGGCAACTGTCATGTATT
                                                                                 Cov-229E-Probe                                                FAM-ATGAACCTGAACACCTGAAGCCAATCTATG
Adenovirus Real-time                                         ADVF                                                                    CAGGACGCYTCGGAGTACCTGA
                                                                                 ADVRI                                                                  CGGTGGTCACATCGTGGGT
                                                                                 ADVRII                                                                 GCTGAAGTACGTVTCGGTGGC
                                                                                 ADVRIII                                                               GGTGAAGTAGGTGTCCGTGGC
                                                                                 ADV Probe                                                          FAM-TGGTGCAGTTYGCCCG-BHQ 1
Enterovirus Real-time                                        AN350-F Primer                                                 GGCCCCTGAATGCGGCTAATCC
                                                                                 AN351-R Primer                                                 GCGATTGTCACCATWAGCAGYCA
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unknown as we did not recruit human subjects nor have access to
patient records. 
Despite previous successful attempts at using the NIOSH two-
stage sampler and PCR analyses to collect and detect aerosolized
influenza A virus,9,10 all samples collected using the NIOSH sam-
pler in this study tested negative for influenza A virus. We did cap-
ture and detect aerosolized adenovirus using the NIOSH samplers,
however, none of the samples from the SKC filter cassettes tested
positive for adenovirus. This result is inconsistent with our previ-
ous study which successfully recovered adenovirus DNA from
aerosol samples collected using the SKC filter cassettes in patient
waiting rooms.11 Sampling sessions in our current study collected
840 L of air using one SKC filter cassette compared to the collec-
tion of 900 L of air per each of two SKC filter cassettes in our pre-
vious study. Additionally, SKC filter cassettes were mobilized in
our current study and stationary in our previous study. The higher
sample volumes collected in our previous study as well as the dif-
ference in mobility and location of the samplers might explain the
difference in positive sample collections among studies.
In addition to bioaerosol sample collection and handling meth-
ods, environmental conditions can also influence the viability of
airborne viruses and downstream virus recovery. For example, pro-
longed sampling periods can compromise stability of virus-laden
aerosols and result in decreased viral recovery.12 Additionally, it
has been demonstrated that the survival of airborne influenza virus
depends on ambient temperature, relative humidity (RH) and ultra-
violet radiation levels.13 Specifically, infectivity of influenza in a
simulated examination room was reported to be the highest at 7-
23% RH, moderate at 57% RH and lowest at 43% RH.14 Although
we did not record temperature and RH at our sampling site, a pre-
vious bioaerosol study recorded levels ranging from 54% to 68%
RH in three different hospitals in Singapore.11 High RH levels in
Singapore could explain the low percentage of influenza A virus-
positive aerosol samples in our study.
One strength of our bioaerosol sampling method is that it is a
quick and non-invasive way to monitor for respiratory viruses
without interrupting patients or healthcare professionals. Also, it
requires little manpower to collect samples and results can be ana-
lyzed within a few hours. However, one limitation of our detection
method was that we did not measure viral load in our aerosol sam-
ples, which makes it difficult to compare our results with quantita-
tive aerosol studies in clinical settings. Additionally, our pilot
study was not designed to collect patient data and therefore we
were not able to match the virus-positive aerosol samples with
individual patients present in the hospital ward at the time of sam-
pling.
Conclusions
In summary, we conducted a 7-week pilot study to monitor for
aerosolized respiratory viruses among inpatients in a pediatric
ward in Singapore. We found molecular evidence of influenza A
virus and adenovirus, demonstrating the potential for airborne
transmission. To comprehend this potential risk of transmission,
our proof-of-concept project might be expanded in the future to
specifically study patients with known positive clinical infections
(e.g. through nasopharyngeal swabs) and determine how far away
viable viruses can be detected from a patient’s bedside.
Additionally, future studies might involve more comprehensive
demographic and clinical risk factor analyses to help us better
understand phenomenon such as super-spreading. Lastly,
bioaerosol surveillance might be useful in monitoring clinical pop-
ulations for incursions of novel respiratory viruses, especially
since aerosol sampling in shared clinical spaces often requires no
informed consent.
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